Explaining consciousness without a central observer › How the spot changes color halfway across

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated December 2, 20253 min read
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Part 7 of 12Mind, Self, and Experience
Chapter 85Explaining consciousness without a central observer › How the spot changes color halfway across
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Dennett and Kinsbourne discuss the color phi finding reported by Paul Kolers and Michael von Grünau. When separated lights of different colors flash in rapid succession, some observers report apparent movement along a path with a relatively abrupt color change between the lights. There is an objective order of physical stimuli and a perceived sequence that includes an event at a location where neither stimulus appeared. A response can represent a color change as taking place along the path once both signals have arrived. No backwards signal from the second flash to the first is needed. Dennett and Kinsbourne, §§1.2.A and 2.2.

The investigators can be interested in how many milliseconds separate the two flashes and how many milliseconds later the observer can use the difference in color. Those are questions about the order and time of physical processes. They can also be interested in where the change appeared to occur along the motion. That is a question about what the observer perceived. Confusing the time a representation is formed with the time represented by it makes the result look mysterious. A newspaper printed today can describe a meeting that happened yesterday. A representation constructed in the brain can likewise organize content into its own temporal sequence.

Now suppose there really is a theater. One story says the brain waits for the second flash, works out the movement and the color change, and displays the edited version. Dennett and Kinsbourne call this Stalinesque revision. Another says the first flash is displayed separately, then the second flash arrives and alters the observer's memory. The final report describes motion and a color change, while the observer has lost access to the original experience. They call this Orwellian revision. The labels designate where the editing falls relative to the supposed moment of presentation. Dennett and Kinsbourne, §2.2.

The two stories can lead to the same answers about what was seen. If an earlier probe reveals that a discrimination was already made, that result tells us something about processing. What it establishes about presentation still depends on how the theater boundary is defined. The multiple drafts model keeps any measurable difference in the processing and drops the requirement for a further verdict about which of two versions was presented first when nothing distinguishes them in the relevant respects. The experiment supplies a case in which an assumption about the format of consciousness makes an otherwise intelligible event seem inexplicable.

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