Explaining consciousness without a central observer › Where the argument leaves experience
PhilosophyAll chapters Reading tools Notes & comments
Explaining consciousness without a central observer › Where the argument leaves experienceSection view · Sections in this chapter8 / 9 ↓
Thomas Nagel's question about what it is like to be an animal can be asked without imagining a theater. Likewise, David Chalmers's later distinction between functional problems and the hard problem does not require him to posit a central inner spectator. For Chalmers, explaining discrimination, information use, and report still leaves the question of why such activity is accompanied by experience. Dennett invites us to see whether a careful account of the varied things organisms perceive, say, and do gives us reason to think there is that further explanatory target. His reply requires more than pointing out the absurdity of a spectator inside a head. Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,” §§2–3.
The strongest place to test the disagreement is a detailed case. In color phi, varying how and when people are asked about the flashes can reveal real differences in how information is used. Researchers can look for processes that register a color without affecting a later response, or for information that persists despite a competing signal. These are sensible questions on Dennett's view. A critic may agree that a single finish line contributes nothing to the experiment and maintain that the appearance of motion still needs a phenomenal explanation. Distinguishing what an observer sees from how it came to be represented clarifies the point at which the two accounts disagree.
Comments
Add to the conversation
A question, a correction, or an example from your own work.
No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts!