Explaining consciousness without a central observer › Qualia and the flavor of coffee
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Dennett takes up a particularly strong conception of qualia in his companion essay “Quining Qualia.” On this conception, an experience has properties that are intrinsic, wholly private, ineffable, and immediately known to the subject. Dennett questions whether the cluster of requirements holds together. Disputants sometimes use qualia more broadly for the qualities experience seems to have. Under that broader use, asking whether you can sense bitterness is a different question from asking whether bitterness as experienced must be a wholly private property, independently of how it affects your judgment and comparisons. Dennett, “Quining Qualia,” §§2 and 4.
His two imaginary coffee tasters, Chase and Sanborn, used to like the same coffee and now dislike it. Chase thinks its flavor has stayed the same while his taste in coffee has changed. Sanborn thinks his preferences are unchanged and the coffee tastes different to him. Both offer recognizable descriptions of their lives. Dennett asks what would establish the contrast each draws. They each have to compare what the coffee tastes like today with a memory and with judgments learned over years. Those comparisons can be affected by several changes at once. The felt certainty each taster expresses is evidence of how things strike them, but it does not by itself specify which mechanism changed. Dennett, “Quining Qualia,” §4, intuition pump 7.
There is room for a reply. A defender of phenomenal qualities can agree that memory and comparisons are fallible and still hold that the coffee has a distinct character right now. The existence of such a character need not depend on infallible access. Dennett's challenge becomes sharper if that character is then defined as something wholly independent of anything the taster can notice, learn, remember, or do. Which part of the taster's situation would motivate a theorist to include that property? A critic of Dennett can press an equally direct question. Does having an account of when a person can discriminate flavors and what they can say about them tell us why the taste feels as it does?
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