The limits of a universal scientific method › The Stone Dropped from a Tower
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The limits of a universal scientific method › The Stone Dropped from a TowerSection view · Sections in this chapter3 / 7 ↓
Feyerabend considers how Galileo treats an argument against the motion of the Earth. Drop a stone from a tower. It lands near the bottom of the tower. If the Earth were moving, an opponent might ask, why does the base of the tower not move a noticeable distance away before the stone lands? The stone's path seems to favor a stationary Earth when the observer takes the apparent vertical motion to tell them how the object moves without further qualification. Against Method, ch. 6, tower argument
In Feyerabend's reading, the force of the objection depends on a natural interpretation. The observer is accustomed to describing a seen movement as the movement of the thing itself, without saying what it is being measured relative to. That use of language appears straightforward until someone asks about a motion the observer, tower, and stone already share. Galileo's defense allows an observer at the tower to describe the stone as falling vertically relative to them while the stone also participates in a common motion with the Earth. The description changes what counts as a contradiction between what was seen and what the Copernican proposal says. Against Method, chs. 6–7
A passenger can drop a key on a smoothly moving vehicle and catch it below the point where it was first held. Looking at the path within the vehicle gives one useful description. A person at the side of the road is in a position to describe a different path relative to the road. The example does not require a judgment about every aspect of the Earth's motion. It helps separate the description of a path in a familiar setting from what would be needed to rule out a background motion shared by the people making that description. The ordinary wording can continue to serve while its scope becomes clearer. Against Method, chs. 6–7, movement and observation
This also makes the argument an example of criticising evidence without discarding an observation. The sight of the stone landing near the tower had been taken to exclude a moving Earth. Trying out the rival picture reveals an assumption needed for that inference. On the new description, the result of the drop still needs explaining. What changes is the set of motions with which the result is compatible. For Feyerabend, someone who required the Copernican account to agree with the accepted description before allowing it to be developed could block the very work by which that compatibility becomes visible. Against Method, ch. 6, inversion of the tower argument
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