Beginning phenomenological inquiry › Objections and Responses
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Beginning phenomenological inquiry › Objections and ResponsesSection view · Sections in this chapter7 / 10 ↓
The argument has to meet an objection raised in the Fifth Meditation itself. If another person's being has to be explicated from the reduced ego's experience, what shows that the other is more than a moment in that experience? Husserl's answer depends on the specific mode of givenness he describes. The other is given as having an original sphere of experience that cannot become mine. The account keeps that difference at the center even while it looks to an experience of mine to understand how the other is given. Méditations cartésiennes, §§42–44, 50–52
A critic can press a further question. Suppose a course of embodied behavior is coherent from my standpoint. Does the coherence suffice to establish that there is a subject who encounters the world from another standpoint? The account of appresentation identifies how other subjectivity can be experienced without assimilating it to my own. This still leaves room for a dispute about what the account establishes and whether that is enough to answer the objection. Reading the objection against section 52 helps locate the disputed step. Méditations cartésiennes, §§42, 52
There is also a risk of treating an analysis of how the other is given as a psychological story about where social skills come from. The further abstraction in section 44 has a specific job. It delimits which constitutive relations are under inquiry, including the otherwise pervasive contribution of the sense of other subjectivity. It is not a developmental claim that an isolated self learned to think about other people at a definite point in its life. Méditations cartésiennes, §§44, 55
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