Beginning phenomenological inquiry › Returning to the Starting Point

Michael BrenndoerferNovember 1, 20261 min read
PhilosophyAll chapters
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Part 7 of 12Mind, Self, and Experience
Chapter 87Beginning phenomenological inquiry › Returning to the Starting Point
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The book takes its point of departure from the inquirer's own experience and eventually asks about the conditions under which a common world can be experienced. The path is demanding because several distinctions have to remain in view. Evidence can give something itself without showing it exhaustively. The ego can have a history of commitments without continuously remaking the acts that established them. Another person's experience can be given to me without becoming an experience I live through originally. Each distinction changes what type of explanation we should expect. Méditations cartésiennes, §§24–28, 31–33, 50–55

In particular, the last distinction keeps the experience of other subjectivity from being measured against the visibility of the chair's back. A hidden side can be uncovered for me. Another person's standpoint can be made intelligible and my sense of it can be checked through their ways of acting and speaking. The distinctive access promised by Husserl's account still leaves the experience as the other's. This is the condition that a theory of how we share a world has to preserve. Méditations cartésiennes, §§50–55

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