Beginning phenomenological inquiry › The Argument, Meditation by Meditation

Michael BrenndoerferNovember 1, 20263 min read
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Part 7 of 12Mind, Self, and Experience
Chapter 87Beginning phenomenological inquiry › The Argument, Meditation by Meditation
Reading section 5 of 10 · The Argument, Meditation by Meditation · 3 minSection 5 of 10 · 3 min

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The five meditations bear different parts of the argument. Much of the work concerns questions that become visible only once we have distinguished how an object is given from which objects we take to exist. It helps to track what Husserl says about each on the way to the question of other minds. Méditations cartésiennes, table of contents

The First Meditation asks for a radical starting point. The world is ordinarily evident before inquiry begins, but ordinary experience can turn out to be misleading. Husserl suspends its acceptance as a basis for inquiry and turns to transcendental subjectivity. This is why the return to the ego need not license an inference to a substance of the kind Husserl attributes to Descartes. Méditations cartésiennes, §§5–11

The Second Meditation examines the structure of what is given. Along with the act of perceiving we can investigate its correlate, the thing as perceived. What the current perceptual act brings to view does not exhaust what the act intends. To see the cube is to be directed toward something whose hidden sides and possible further appearances are already in play. A horizon is an open range of such implications or further possibilities, not a second object standing behind the one we see. Méditations cartésiennes, §§14, 17–21

The Third Meditation asks about evidence as a distinctive way something is given. I can think that a chair out of reach has a rough surface or actually put my hand on it and feel the roughness. The change matters for the way the object is given, apart from how confident I feel. Husserl also recognizes the possibility of disappointment and correction. An ordinary encounter with a thing gives evidence without displaying every side of it or ruling out all subsequent revision. Méditations cartésiennes, §§24–28

The Fourth Meditation asks about the ego itself. It is a pole of identity through multiple acts. It is also the bearer of convictions and decisions that last after the act in which they were formed. Suppose I make a decision on Monday and remain committed to it on Tuesday without repeating Monday's act of deciding. The decision still characterizes me. Recalling the act is different from continuing to hold the commitment. Husserl uses such examples to explain how habitualities can belong to the continuing ego. Méditations cartésiennes, §§31–33

In the Fifth Meditation Husserl formulates the problem of solipsism. How can inquiry starting with the reduced ego give an account of another subject? He introduces a further abstraction, setting aside what depends on the experience of others in order to delimit a sphere of ownness. This is a methodological separation of layers. It does not describe a period when a person first existed alone and later discovered that other people were present. Méditations cartésiennes, §§42–44, 55

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