Beginning phenomenological inquiry › The Fifth Meditation and Other Minds

Michael BrenndoerferNovember 1, 20263 min read
PhilosophyAll chapters
Reading tools Notes & comments
Notes & comments
Part 7 of 12Mind, Self, and Experience
Chapter 87Beginning phenomenological inquiry › The Fifth Meditation and Other Minds
Reading section 6 of 10 · The Fifth Meditation and Other Minds · 3 minSection 6 of 10 · 3 min

Section 6 of 10 · 3 min read

Beginning phenomenological inquiry › The Fifth Meditation and Other MindsSection view · Sections in this chapter6 / 10 ↓

Husserl's answer starts from an analogy with perceiving a thing. In seeing a chair, more is intended than the side now exposed to view. Appresentation is a way the rest belongs to what is perceived without becoming directly present. Seeing the other person's body likewise has a significance beyond the arrangement of colored surfaces in front of me. Husserl asks how this particular form of co-givenness can be motivated within my own sphere of experience. Méditations cartésiennes, §50

The core of the account is what Husserl calls pairing. My own body is already given as a lived body. A body over there is experienced through an association with it. The similarity motivates a transfer of sense, so what I see is given as another lived body. Husserl describes this as a passive association rather than an argument from a premise about resemblance to a conclusion that a mind must be hidden behind it. Méditations cartésiennes, §§50–51

The cases differ in how confirmation proceeds. I could walk around the chair and bring the formerly hidden side directly into view. The other person's experience cannot be given in that way as my own, since then it would no longer be the experience of another. The mode of access has its own confirmation. Husserl points to the coherence of the other's embodied behavior over time. Breaks in that coherence can prompt a correction of how I initially experienced what was in front of me. Méditations cartésiennes, §§50–52

The analysis goes beyond the claim that I experience an animated body. The other's body is there for me and also experienced by the other from their own standpoint. Other objects can likewise hold their identity through differences between my possible experiences and theirs. Section 55 takes up this possibility as part of the constitution of intersubjective nature, an early layer in the account of a common objective world. The argument concerns different modes of access to the same world. It leaves room for disagreement about what either person has seen. Méditations cartésiennes, §§53–55

The unfamiliar angle

If a friend describes an object from across the table, you can understand that a feature is visible from where they sit and hidden from where you sit. You could switch seats and test the difference in visibility. Degrees of visibility illustrate a common object accessible in different ways. Occupying a similar spatial position would still give you your experience, while theirs was given to them. Méditations cartésiennes, §§53–55

Comments

Add to the conversation

A question, a correction, or an example from your own work.

No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts!

Newsletter

Stay up to date

Get new articles, book updates, and notes on AI and technology.

Unsubscribe at any time. Privacy policy