Bracketing and the structure of experience › Does the Bracket Leave Enough to Work With?
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Bracketing and the structure of experience › Does the Bracket Leave Enough to Work With?Section view · Sections in this chapter7 / 9 ↓
A natural objection is that suspending a claim about the world would remove the object of inquiry. If you put the cup in brackets, what could be left but a series of private states? Husserl's tree example explains his response. The reduced perception is still directed toward the tree as perceived, with its particular look. The object-as-experienced is not another physical thing taking the place of the tree. The shift makes the relation between perception and what it is of a subject for inquiry. Ideen I, §§31–33, 88–90
A different objection concerns reflection. Turning from looking at a tree to examining the perception is a new act. Why suppose it gives access to what the unreflective situation was like? Husserl treats problems of self-observation explicitly. He holds that reflection can be used to study essential features of experiences. A critic can still ask whether a particular report distinguishes what was given earlier from features noticed only when the investigator began to reflect. Ideen I, §§77–79
One way to keep that objection concrete is to compare a description formed while following an object as it turns with a description written from memory. A later report can omit an expectation you had during the first experience. If the earlier expectation is what the conclusion depends on, you need a way of giving it in the reflection, rather than assuming it was there because the conclusion sounds plausible. This caution is in keeping with Husserl's demand that an account stay within what is given. Ideen I, §§24, 77–79
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