Bracketing and the structure of experience › How the Reduction Works
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Bracketing and the structure of experience › How the Reduction WorksSection view · Sections in this chapter5 / 9 ↓
The reduction lets Husserl ask how a single thing can be given through changes that belong to our experiencing of it. It is helpful to keep the perceived thing in view as we work through the distinction.
Imagine lifting a plain cup by the handle and turning it. The position of the handle changes in your field of vision. The experience belongs to a continuing perception of a cup, even though no single view displays all the sides. What you see also makes room for expectations about what would come into view next. It is possible for an appearance to prompt a correction, as when the mark you expected on the other side turns out to be absent. Ideen I, §§41–44, 46
A description in ordinary terms could explain why the cup appears larger when you hold it closer. A phenomenological description can instead distinguish the cup as experienced from any passage of colors or shapes through view. The cup is given through its profiles. Further questions about whether it is in fact a certain cup or exists in the room remain separable from what this way of appearing is like. Ideen I, §§41–44, 88–90
Husserl uses a blossoming apple tree. We can attend to the act of perceiving it and also to the tree as perceived, with its blossoms and its place in the garden. Bracketing does not make the blossoms vanish from the description or lead to a search for another tree in the mind. It changes how one makes use of the existence of the object in giving an account of the perception. Ideen I, §§88–89
In section 89 Husserl says the tree can burn, whereas the sense of the perception cannot. The point is that the features of the physical thing and the features of what we are analyzing as a perceptual sense are different. Two people might both refer to the tree by way of its blossoming. A botanist's description of those blossoms as physical objects and a phenomenologist's description of the tree as appearing in bloom have different aims, even if some of the words are the same. Ideen I, §§89–90
Thus inquiry into constitution can ask how something comes to have the sense of an identical thing through appearances that vary. Calling the inquiry constitutive leaves the issue of causal production aside. There is still a question about whether what is described is essential to the type of experience or incidental to this occurrence. Ideen I, §§41–44, 55, 69–75
Think of the same apple tree first as something you are looking at, then as something you remember from yesterday. The object can be intended as the same, but how it is given differs. Having a visible branch in front of you is not the same kind of access as remembering where you saw it. This exercise asks about the modes of givenness rather than whether the memory is veridical. Ideen I, §§88–91, 99
Husserl assigns an important role to free imagination in the clarification of essences. Vary the cup's color, size, position, and surroundings. Then ask which differences matter for the kind of seeing you wish to describe. If you imagine seeing a blue cup and a yellow one, both can be cases of a spatial thing being given through a limited profile. The color does not settle the kind of givenness. The important step is finding a feature of the way experience presents a spatial thing, rather than deciding what material or design a cup needs to function as one. Ideen I, §§4, 41–44, 69–70
The horizon of a perception is clearer if you distinguish what you'd learn by turning the cup from what you would learn by inspecting a photograph of it. When you turn the cup, the side that was only anticipated can come into view, as the first side recedes from view. A photograph preserves one perspective. Enlarging it might reveal a mark that was always visible from that position, but no magnification can uncover the side the camera never faced. In Husserl's account, the succession of views belongs to the experience of one object, and each new view has limits of its own. Ideen I, §§41–44
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