Bracketing and the structure of experience › The Vocabulary of the Inquiry
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Bracketing and the structure of experience › The Vocabulary of the InquirySection view · Sections in this chapter4 / 9 ↓
Several terms refer to distinct features of the inquiry. Their differences become clearer if we keep returning to a single example.
The ordinary stance in which the world is there for us and we investigate, act, or judge on that basis. The stance persists through changes of attention, questions about particular objects, and theoretical work on the natural world. Ideen I, §§27–31
The phenomenological epoché puts the general thesis of the natural attitude out of use for a delimited investigation. It allows us to describe an experience and its object as experienced while abstaining from the ordinary judgment of existence that might accompany it. Ideen I, §§31–32
The directedness by which an experience is an experience of something. Seeing a cup and remembering it both have an object, given in different ways. Husserl distinguishes the intentional experience from ingredients within it he does not treat as intentional on their own. Ideen I, §§35–37, 84–85
The act can be considered in terms of its noetic features, by which it intends something in a determinate way. The noema belongs on the side of the intentional correlate, such as the perceived as perceived. The distinction is not between two material items in the scene. Ideen I, §§88–90
An inquiry into essential structures. Free variation in imagination can help reveal what belongs to a kind of experience, rather than to a single occurrence. This question about structures differs from the decision to bracket the ordinary acceptance of the world. Ideen I, §§2–4, 69–72
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