Bracketing and the structure of experience › What Bracketing Looks Like in Practice
PhilosophyAll chapters Reading tools Notes & comments
Bracketing and the structure of experience › What Bracketing Looks Like in PracticeSection view · Sections in this chapter6 / 9 ↓
Try the inquiry with a die. Turn it over slowly. Note when a face disappears, what you still take the thing to be, and what you expect to see if you turn it back. One might report several changing patterns of spots while still experiencing a single die. Now imagine that the view from the other side unexpectedly reveals a depression where you anticipated a flat face. Which part of your account would need to change? The surprise shows that what the earlier perception intended went beyond the spots in direct view. Ideen I, §§41–44, 46
To bring out a second contrast, set the die down and imagine it. You can bring an unseen face to mind without turning the die itself. You can imagine a different position or a new mark immediately. Husserl takes clearly given imaginative examples seriously in the study of essences, but distinguishing imagination and actual perception is part of what such a study has to do. Ideen I, §§4, 70, 88–91
The role of these examples is limited. They draw attention to differences anyone undertaking the analysis can try to distinguish. They do not prove broad claims about consciousness by picking the most convenient object. A careful description has to say which feature is under study, what variant was introduced, and what the example actually gives a reason to acknowledge.
Comments
Add to the conversation
A question, a correction, or an example from your own work.
No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts!