Bracketing and the structure of experience › The Natural Attitude
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Bracketing and the structure of experience › The Natural AttitudeSection view · Sections in this chapter2 / 9 ↓
In this attitude I find myself among things, activities, and other people. Much of the surrounding world is given as a background. I can look up from the desk and notice something that was previously outside my focus. The animal that moves by the window can redirect my attention, while the cup still belongs to the setting even during the moments when I am not looking at it. Husserl calls attention to this surrounding world and the way it extends beyond what is presently noticed. Ideen I, §§27–30
Being in the natural attitude is compatible with both doubt about a particular thing and a great deal of theoretical work. The person at the desk might wonder whether the cup has cracked. Investigating the crack would ordinarily presuppose that there is a world in which the cup, the desk, and the investigator belong. Husserl says the sciences of the natural attitude seek better and more reliable knowledge on this ground. His own inquiry begins by changing how he proceeds on that ground. Ideen I, §§28–32
This distinction matters for the role of certainty. I can be accustomed to working with a cup on the desk and still have an uncertain view of its surface. The habitual sense of an environment being there supports particular judgments of varying quality. Husserl's general thesis of the natural attitude names this underlying acceptance. It does not have to take the form of a proposition that someone deliberately recites each morning. Ideen I, §§30–31
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