Reasoning about necessity and possibility › A World With a Different Guest List
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Imagine two complete scenarios for a committee meeting. In the first, Alice is the sole member present, and she has signed the minutes. In the second, Alice and Bob are both present, and Alice has signed but Bob has not. Suppose both scenarios count as possible from the standpoint of the first. Then each person present in the first scenario has signed in every relevant scenario: Alice is that person. Yet it is false that everyone present signs in every relevant scenario. Bob is the counterexample in the second one.
It takes some care to express the difference. One reading fixes the people in the actual scenario and asks whether each has a property in all relevant alternatives. The other visits each alternative first, then asks whether all the people present there have the property. The two procedures can choose different people. This is a variation on one of the counterexamples in Saul Kripke's “Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic”, originally published in 1963. He uses it to show why putting a quantifier before or after “necessarily” changes what a sentence requires.
The paper begins with a framework for modal sentences and concentrates on extending it to quantifiers. Its motivating questions are precise. Which other situations matter to truth at a given situation? Which individuals do quantifiers range over in each one? How can a variable keep referring to an individual when the evaluation moves to another situation? Kripke proposes specific answers and shows what follows from them.
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