Reasoning about necessity and possibility › How a Relation Governs a Logical Law

Michael BrenndoerferNovember 1, 20263 min read
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Part 8 of 12Logic, Language, and Interpretation
Chapter 97Reasoning about necessity and possibility › How a Relation Governs a Logical Law
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Start with □A implies A. If each world is accessible from itself, necessity of A at w requires A at w. This is the role of reflexivity. A modern textbook may label the axiom or basic reflexive system T. The 1963 paper calls the basic model structures M, and discusses stronger systems obtained by adding conditions. The letter K in Kripke's triple is the set of worlds, regardless of what names a later textbook gives to modal calculi.

Transitivity supplies a second familiar case. If v is accessible from w and u from v, transitivity makes u accessible from w. Suppose □A holds at w. Then A is true throughout the alternatives to w. Every alternative to v is among those points, so □A holds at v. Since the same reasoning applies to each v accessible from w, □□A holds at w. This is how the axiom □A implies □□A is validated on transitive structures. Reflexivity and transitivity characterize the S4 structures in Kripke's discussion.

We can test the role of transitivity with the three plans. Keep every world's access to itself. Give the first access to the second and the second access to the third. Leave out the first world's access to the third. A proposition that is true at the first and second and false at the third is necessary at the first. It is not necessary at the second, so it fails to be necessarily necessary at the first. The countermodel spells out the exact missing link.

Kripke also distinguishes a symmetric case, associated with the Brouwersche system, and an equivalence relation for S5. In an equivalence relation, worlds fall into classes in which each member is accessible from every member of the class. A world in one class need not have access to a world in another. The set of accessible worlds stays the same as one moves within a class. That restricted statement explains why possibility can be stable across alternatives in S5, even though worlds may differ in what is actually true at each of them.

The paper states a completeness result relating logical derivability in the named calculi to validity at the distinguished world across the corresponding model structures. This is a connection between two tests. Soundness says the deductive rules license only valid formulas, while completeness says they suffice to derive every valid formula. Establishing that a formula is valid takes more than finding one model in which it is true. Finding one model of the right kind where it fails, however, is enough to disprove its validity.

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