Reasoning about necessity and possibility › What the Semantics Commits Us To
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Reasoning about necessity and possibility › What the Semantics Commits Us ToSection view · Sections in this chapter8 / 9 ↓
The structure can be used with different interpretations, but the truth of a particular formula depends on the interpretation one actually supplies. Kripke illustrates the point near the end of the paper by considering provability interpretations. In one, worlds include a consistent extension of Peano arithmetic together with a model of that extension. An alternative is accessible if its theory extends the original one. More information can then narrow which models remain under consideration. Reflexivity and transitivity come from how extension works. The proposal lets Kripke connect a necessity claim about an arithmetical sentence to what the associated extension proves.
This is another example of the distinction between a verified interpretation and a label. Calling alternatives “worlds” does not establish a particular principle about them. The relation has to be given, the valuations have to be specified, and the inference must hold on the resulting structures. In the arithmetic interpretation, taking a further extension need not be reversible. In the committee case, access can be symmetric even with different populations. The apparatus is flexible enough for both, and explicit enough that we can see what would need to change if we wanted a different result.
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