The reality of possible worlds › How Could the Morning Have Gone Differently?
PhilosophyAll chapters Reading tools Notes & comments
The reality of possible worlds › How Could the Morning Have Gone Differently?Section view · Sections in this chapter1 / 9 ↓
Suppose you left home without an umbrella, expecting rain. The sky stayed clear. Later you say it could have rained. Now imagine you also claim that if it had rained, you would have gone back for your umbrella. These statements differ. The first says that rain was possible. The second picks out what you would have done on the supposition that it rained. The second would be hard to defend if the only way for rain to be possible involved a different history in which you never owned an umbrella. A satisfactory theory ought to explain what each statement requires.
David Lewis's proposal in On the Plurality of Worlds (1986), §§1.1–1.3 starts from a literal reading of possible worlds. It assigns a role to worlds in which it rains and lets us compare ways those worlds differ from ours. For Lewis, the other worlds that make this account possible are as real as the world we inhabit. They exist independently of any act of imagining them, and their inhabitants are parts of them in the way we are parts of ours.
You can grant the usefulness of the umbrella story while withholding belief in Lewis's worlds. That gap is where his argument begins. He needs to show that treating possible worlds as genuine entities gives us enough explanatory benefit to justify believing in them.
Comments
Add to the conversation
A question, a correction, or an example from your own work.
No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts!