The reality of possible worlds › Possibility, Necessity, and a Comparison of Worlds

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated June 10, 20253 min read
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Part 6 of 12Being, Change, and Possibility
Chapter 78The reality of possible worlds › Possibility, Necessity, and a Comparison of Worlds
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The reality of possible worlds › Possibility, Necessity, and a Comparison of WorldsSection view · Sections in this chapter4 / 9 ↓

For unrestricted possibility about how things could have been, the starting idea is straightforward. It is possible that it rains if it rains at some world. It is necessary that it rains if it rains at every world. These are claims about where a proposition is true. They do not say that rain is an object whose physical presence in another universe we can detect. Lewis's discussion in §1.2 also distinguishes restricted kinds of possibility. When we ask whether something could happen under the actual laws of nature, we have imposed a condition on the worlds relevant to the question. Other worlds could still be relevant to a broader claim about what might have happened under different laws.

The umbrella conditional requires another piece of reasoning. The fact that somewhere it rains and you go back for your umbrella is too weak. It leaves open whether the worlds where you do that are relevantly similar to this one. Requiring you to go back for your umbrella at every rainy world would be too strong, since some otherwise very different rainy worlds do not contain anything suitable to stand in for the person who set out from your home. The analysis asks how the consequent fares in antecedent worlds when compared from the standpoint of the world in which we are evaluating the claim.

Lewis presents an idealization in §1.3, “Closeness”. Suppose there is one relevantly closest world in which the antecedent holds. Then the conditional is true when the consequent holds at that world. The selection depends on the antecedent, the background facts and the context of the discussion. In our example the ordinary conditions of your trip might be more relevant to the match than keeping the pavement dry. Lewis uses a different example involving tailless kangaroos to illustrate why the comparison need not change every feature one can imagine changing.

The assumption of a single best match belongs to the illustration. Lewis explicitly entertains ties and the possibility that a sequence of better matches never reaches a closest antecedent world at all. He also considers the idea that a successful antecedent world can be closer than all the antecedent worlds where the consequent fails. This is a comparative condition. It does not require the successful world to be closest among all antecedent worlds. The essential teaching point is that a 'would' conditional makes a more selective demand than the possibility claim with which we began.

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