The reality of possible worlds › Who Could Have Played the Piano?

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated June 10, 20253 min read
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Part 6 of 12Being, Change, and Possibility
Chapter 78The reality of possible worlds › Who Could Have Played the Piano?
Reading section 5 of 9 · Who Could Have Played the Piano? · 3 minSection 5 of 9 · 3 min

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The reality of possible worlds › Who Could Have Played the Piano?Section view · Sections in this chapter5 / 9 ↓

Suppose your friends say that you could have been a concert pianist. The claim concerns you, and they mean more than that some person somewhere could play the instrument. If worlds are isolated and their inhabitants do not overlap in the ordinary way, how can another world tell us what you might have done?

Lewis's answer is counterpart theory. A counterpart is a distinct individual who can represent you for the purpose of evaluating such a claim. The choice depends on resemblance in relevant respects. For the career example, a person with a similar early life and different later choices might be a better candidate than somebody who has your eye color and little else in common with you. Lewis gives his own example involving Hubert Humphrey in §4.1, “Good Questions and Bad”. A counterpart's electoral victory is supposed to represent our Humphrey as winning, even though the counterpart is a different person. In his earlier counterpart theory paper, §1, he sets out a quantified language with an explicit relation for this role.

Counterparts

The relation helps explain how a modal claim can be about a particular actual individual. The individual remains the subject of the claim. A counterpart's life helps determine how that claim comes out.

It is worth slowing down over the last point. One objection says that the existence of a pianist elsewhere can tell us nothing about what would have happened to you. Lewis can say that the objection switches between the subject of the claim and what is supposed to make it true. The subject here is you, just as the person represented by a wax figure in his illustration is still Humphrey. An opponent can grant that the theory is intended to work this way and still argue that relevant similarity cannot do the job. Asking whether a particular resemblance is enough puts pressure on the theory without assuming that Lewis has confused two people.

A further wrinkle prevents a different oversimplification. In §4.1 Lewis distinguishes a world sharing one of its inhabitants with another world from a mereological sum composed of parts from different worlds. He signals there that he will allow cross-world sums while treating them as oddities, rather than using them to explain how ordinary individuals could live alternative lives. So the point of counterpart theory is not established by the slogan that no entity can have parts in different worlds. It is an account of how a world represents something concerning a person who is not among its inhabitants.

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