The reality of possible worlds › The Payoff and Its Price

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated June 10, 20252 min read
PhilosophyAll chapters
Reading tools Notes & comments
Notes & comments
Part 6 of 12Being, Change, and Possibility
Chapter 78The reality of possible worlds › The Payoff and Its Price
Reading section 6 of 9 · The Payoff and Its Price · 2 minSection 6 of 9 · 2 min

Section 6 of 9 · 2 min read

The reality of possible worlds › The Payoff and Its PriceSection view · Sections in this chapter6 / 9 ↓

Lewis compares the proposed plurality of worlds with the role that sets play in mathematics in §1.1. A theory can enlarge the range of things it says exist while reducing the number of unexplained concepts it needs to describe them. The aim is to systematize more of our commitments using a smaller or more coherent starting vocabulary. The extra entities are part of the cost of buying that kind of economy.

Consider properties as one example of the possible payoff. If we represent a property by the set of the things in our world that have it, different properties could be represented by the same set. Lewis discusses apparently coextensive properties in §1.5, “Properties”. Suppose all the objects in our example that have one feature happen to have another. If there is a possible individual that has only the first feature, the extended collections across worlds will differ. Turning to all the possible instances lets his account distinguish extensions that would coincide when the domain is restricted to this world.

That step does not establish that any pair of distinct properties will have different extensions. If their instances could never come apart, enlarging the domain does not separate the two sets. Nor does identifying useful sets settle all questions about which properties are natural or explain similarities. Lewis addresses a difference between plentiful set-like properties and natural properties in the same section. What the example shows is how the additional worlds solve a particular problem for an extension-based analysis, under the condition that the two extensions were only accidentally the same.

Lewis treats systematizing benefits as a reason to believe his thesis, while granting that they could be outweighed or achieved more cheaply. In §2.8, “The Incredulous Stare”, he also gives common sense weight. A theory can lose credibility by discarding too many beliefs we already have. Its gains must compensate for that loss. A reader might give greater weight than Lewis does to the common belief that what exists is exhausted by the actual world. That is a disagreement about the costs of a theory and how much credit its benefits deserve.

Comments

Add to the conversation

A question, a correction, or an example from your own work.

No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts!

Newsletter

Stay up to date

Get new articles, book updates, and notes on AI and technology.

Unsubscribe at any time. Privacy policy