Descriptions and logical form › Existence, Uniqueness, and Predication

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated July 21, 20253 min read
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Part 8 of 12Logic, Language, and Interpretation
Chapter 99Descriptions and logical form › Existence, Uniqueness, and Predication
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Russell analyzes the proposition expressed by a sentence containing the definite description. Take the form The F is G. For example, in The keeper of the archive is out, let F stand for being keeper of the archive under discussion and G for being out at the relevant time. The analysis gives three demands:

  1. At least one individual is F.
  2. At most one individual is F.
  3. The individual who is F is G.

Combine the first two and you have exactly one F. The third then gives a further condition about that unique individual. In a contemporary rendering, there is some x such that x is F, anything that is F is identical with x, and x is G. This is an explanatory rendering of Russell's conditions rather than a quotation of his notation. “On Denoting,” exposition and application, pp. 481–482 and 492

The three demands can fail independently. In a building with a vacant keeper position, the existence condition fails. In a building with two equal keepers and no further restriction, uniqueness fails even if both keepers are out. If there is one keeper and she is in, existence and uniqueness hold and predication fails. The analysis separates failures that the original sentence could leave you unsure how to diagnose. When the job is defined more narrowly, such as keeper of the manuscript archive on duty this evening, the domain of the description changes. You then test the same conditions using the narrower description.

Why An Empty Description Can Be Understood

On Russell's analysis, The F is G is true only if there is exactly one F and that individual is G. Identifying these conditions does not require supplying an F in advance. If there is no F, the analysis gives a false proposition with intelligible conditions.

In the king example, it is enough for the first condition to fail. We never reach a separate question about a particular person's hair. This makes it possible to explain the failure without treating a nonexistent monarch as the subject of a further statement. Russell replies to a different proposed treatment of descriptions by asking how we could accept a round square as the object designated by the round square. He can instead analyze the whole sentence in a way that asks for a unique thing satisfying contradictory conditions. On that analysis there is no need to supply such a thing. “On Denoting,” pp. 482–483 and 490–491

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