Difference without a prior identity › Difference and the Terms We Compare

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated December 22, 20253 min read
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Part 6 of 12Being, Change, and Possibility
Chapter 77Difference without a prior identity › Difference and the Terms We Compare
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Ask how a violin differs from a cello and the answer can make good use of a common concept. Both belong to a family of instruments. Within that family you can distinguish them by size, range, or the way they are played. The comparison works because you already know something about what the terms are. It would be a strange complaint that the classification does not describe everything about how either instrument came to be. Classification has its own job. The complaint gains force when the resources of classification are taken to exhaust what difference can mean.

In chapter 1, “Difference in Itself,” Deleuze distinguishes four ways that philosophical representation orders difference: identity in the concept, opposition in the determination, analogy in judgment, and resemblance in perception. See the chapter's opening, especially pp. 28–31 of Patton's translation. These operations need not all be present when you compare the violin and cello. The larger point is that each operation can give difference a role only through a prior way of organizing its terms. If we want to understand how determinate terms become available to compare, the account therefore needs more than those operations.

Consider a counterproposal. Instead of beginning with two independent performances and asking which sounds alike, begin with the relations that give a phrase its musical shape. A note that moves from an accented to an unaccented part of the phrase can have a different function even though we can identify the pitch as the same. This is an illustration of a difference in function that comparison of individual pitches does not capture. It is also limited. It cannot show that all such relations generate their terms or that Deleuze's metaphysics follows from music. Its purpose is to make the distinction between comparing identities and asking what gives a term its role less abstract.

Deleuze tests his account against Hegel, who hardly ignores movement or opposition. On Deleuze's reading, the issue is the explanatory priority given to negation and the way the movement comes back to identity. That is his criticism of Hegel in chapter 1, not a substitute for reading Hegel's argument. A Hegelian can object that the identity reached in a dialectical development is itself articulated through difference. For Deleuze the question remains whether the difference can be thought without taking that outcome or the form of contradiction as its condition. The dispute is about the work that difference performs, not about which of the two writers uses the word more often.

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