Difference without a prior identity › Repetition, Habit, and the Past
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Difference without a prior identity › Repetition, Habit, and the PastSection view · Sections in this chapter3 / 7 ↓
It is useful to keep two questions apart. The first is what makes familiar acts interchangeable. The second is what a sequence does to the person who lives through it. Suppose you hear the paired sounds of a machine starting up. After a few cycles, you begin to expect the second sound when you hear the first. On the machine side, the cycles can be treated as separate occurrences. On the listener's side, the first sound now comes with a tendency, an expectation that it did not have on the first cycle.
This adapts the opening case in chapter 2, “Repetition for Itself,” especially Patton pp. 70–74. Deleuze develops an observation from Hume: repeated cases change something in the mind that attends to them. His first synthesis, habit, is a passive contraction. A series is held together as a living present with a direction toward what is expected. You can deliberately count the cycles or compare them afterward. The expectation in the example does not require you to have done either.
Think of the listener's expectation as a feature of an ongoing present. Earlier instances affect how the current sound is experienced, and the current sound already points forward. Contraction names that involvement of past and future in the present. It does not mean that the machine compresses several events into one physical instant.
The second synthesis concerns the past. Try to remember the very first time you heard the machine. You may reproduce some detail in your present act of remembering. But that act presupposes there is a past from which the earlier experience can be recalled. Deleuze, drawing on Bergson, distinguishes the active recovery of a memory from the passive synthesis by which the past has its being. If the past were merely one present now replaced by another, it would be hard to explain how the earlier present could be recovered as past in the first place. See chapter 2, the discussion of the pure past at pp. 79–85. The distinction prevents a misleading summary in which habit happens by itself and the second synthesis simply means making a conscious effort to remember.
The third synthesis asks how time can order a break that cannot be understood as merely the return of an already settled identity. In the discussion of the empty form of time, a decisive cut organizes a before and after, and the agent who seemed to organize the sequence can itself be changed in the process. Deleuze links this third synthesis to a reading of Nietzsche's eternal return. Its philosophical function here concerns what can return through difference, rather than a prediction that the same sequence of events will occur again. Read chapter 2, “Repetition for Itself,” the third synthesis and its discussion of future, pp. 85–91.
These syntheses answer different questions. Habit makes it possible for the sound to be experienced in a present stretched toward what is expected. The pure past concerns how a present can pass and be remembered. The third synthesis gives an account of a future irreducible to the continuing reproduction of the same agent and conditions. It is tempting to assign one synthesis to each activity on a schedule, but then we would already be assuming the ordinary sequence of past, present and future that the chapter tries to account for.
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