Difference without a prior identity › What Repeats at a Commemoration?
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Difference without a prior identity › What Repeats at a Commemoration?Section view · Sections in this chapter1 / 7 ↓
Suppose a town holds an annual ceremony for a particular event. If an organizer replaces a broken chair before the ceremony, the replacement serves the same purpose. If the organizer replaces the event being commemorated with some other event of the same general kind, the ceremony has changed its subject. The first substitution is ordinary. The second shows that whatever is being repeated in the ceremony depends on a relation to something singular.
Gilles Deleuze begins Difference and Repetition with this kind of distinction. His own example is a festival tied to an event it cannot simply reproduce. He contrasts repetition of this kind with the generality that lets us substitute one equivalent term for another. Read the Introduction, “Repetition and Difference,” pp. 1–3 in Paul Patton's translation. Deleuze asks why we should think the repeated event is adequately explained by what two ceremonies have in common. There may be a connection that survives large changes in how the ceremony looks.
That is one entrance to the book's larger problem. Look at a finished thing and it can seem natural to start with its identity, then compare it with other finished things. Deleuze asks what we miss when we use comparison as our first account of difference. In some cases the relations that produce things are precisely what comparison of the products leaves out. He wants philosophy to make those relations intelligible in their own right. The claim is stronger than the familiar observation that things change. It concerns which kinds of difference can help explain how the things we identify arise at all.
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