Difference without a prior identity › Recognition and Encounter

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated December 22, 20253 min read
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Part 6 of 12Being, Change, and Possibility
Chapter 77Difference without a prior identity › Recognition and Encounter
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Recognition is what happens when you see, touch, and remember something as one object. Consider picking up a familiar key. Its shape, the way it feels, and what you know of its use can agree well enough for you to act. That agreement is useful. Chapter 3, “The Image of Thought,” asks why philosophers should elevate it into the model of thinking as such. The analysis puts common sense, the practical concordance of the faculties, alongside the presumption that thought naturally has an affinity for truth. See pp. 129–136 in Patton's translation. When those ideas are assumed from the beginning, the disruption that makes an unfamiliar problem visible is easy to miss.

Imagine the key turns and the door stays shut. You might recognize the failure immediately as a known type of problem, like a broken latch. But suppose the familiar explanations all fit poorly. Now you may have to ask what you took a key turning to establish about the rest of the mechanism. The example gives a modest sense of the shift from fitting a case to an established description to finding out what the problem is. The distinction does not depend on the amount of surprise you feel. A shock to an expectation is useful here only insofar as it changes the question you can ask.

Deleuze's encounter is a stronger claim about the origin of thought. In the encounter passage (chapter 3, pp. 139–141 in Patton's translation), something presses a faculty to its limit instead of presenting an object on which all the faculties already agree. The activity of thinking comes under a demand it did not set for itself. This puts the genesis of a thought in a different light from its subsequent recognition as a correct statement. A philosopher can therefore grant the usefulness of identifying familiar objects and still ask whether recognition explains the work of discovering a problem.

A useful check is to distinguish getting the provided question right from finding out which question has to be answered. In a familiar exercise, the problem has been cast in terms that let a student demonstrate a known skill. Outside the exercise, determining the conditions of the problem can itself be the hardest part. The book's later account of Ideas makes this more than a teaching preference. Deleuze wants the problem to have a determinate structure of its own, one that is connected with the solution without duplicating it.

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