What numbers are › Concepts, Objects, and Context

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated May 4, 20263 min read
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Part 8 of 12Logic, Language, and Interpretation
Chapter 94What numbers are › Concepts, Objects, and Context
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Three principles at the end of the Introduction guide the inquiry. Frege distinguishes the logical and objective from the psychological and subjective. He asks about the meaning of a word in the context of a sentence. He also keeps concepts distinct from objects. A deck can fall under the concept complete deck. The deck is a particular thing and can fall under several concepts. The concept supplies a condition that can be met by other objects as well.

The context principle gives Frege an alternative to asking what picture the word “seven” brings to mind. Suppose two people read “there are seven envelopes in the drawer.” One pictures the envelopes in a row. The other sees them in a stack. They understand the same assertion well enough to disagree over whether it is true. If three of the envelopes are removed, their mental images need not change for the assertion to become false. Starting with what the whole sentence says helps explain how speakers can share a claim despite picturing it differently.

A number statement assigns something to a concept. This does not mean the number itself is a concept. In §§55–60, Frege explores why numbers behave like objects. Compare “there is one survivor” and “the number of survivors is one.” In the second sentence, one occurs alongside another expression for what Frege takes to be that very number. The statement identifies an object. It also tells us how many things fall under survivor. Frege needs to explain why these two aspects can go together. One cannot simply point to the object one in the room.

The distinction also matters when a count changes. “The number of people in this room” may designate a different number in five minutes. In §46 Frege compares a condition that changes with the time to one whose reference time has been fixed. The concept person in this room at noon on August 3 does not acquire new instances when someone comes in at half past twelve. The number stays the same. This is compatible with there being something objective to discover about how many people satisfy the present-tense condition.

In §§52–54, Frege distinguishes a characteristic that belongs to the definition of a concept from a property of the concept itself. If a pencil falls under red pencil, it has to be red. But the concept red pencils on this desk can have exactly one instance, even though a pencil itself cannot have exactly one instance in this sense. Adding a second red pencil makes the statement about how many there are false. The first pencil remains red. The change affects a property of the concept in the situation, without altering a characteristic its instances must have. This explains how a numerical statement can be about a concept even when its truth depends on objects you can see and count.

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