What numbers are › Which Commitments Do the Work?
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What numbers are › Which Commitments Do the Work?Section view · Sections in this chapter7 / 8 ↓
Frege presents much of the argument in prose in 1884. The later Basic Laws of Arithmetic attempts to carry out the formal derivation. Its Basic Law V governs the identity of courses of values, including extensions associated with concepts. Frege's 1902 reply to Russell acknowledges that the contradiction Russell found bears on that law. The question about extensions in §68 is therefore consequential. A move from a criterion for equality to a theory of objects has to be evaluated by what that theory permits. A logic that supplies these objects too freely can license contradictory claims.
The pairing criterion itself can be understood without accepting Basic Law V. When cups and saucers match, we can understand why they have the same count without specifying numbers as the extensions Frege proposes. The converse question is more demanding. Even if a theory starts with this equivalence, it needs to show what follows about numbers and whether those commitments qualify as purely logical. Distinguishing the criterion from the proposed definition lets us see why the first can be studied after difficulties have emerged for the second.
There is a difference too between using arithmetic to answer a question and using a proof to learn what arithmetic depends on. Establishing the count of people in the room uses information about actual people and a time. Establishing the identity conditions of the numbers used in the answer has a different aim. Frege's inquiry begins with an ordinary number statement and makes that difference explicit. The analysis of counting still explains something even if one remains unconvinced by the proposed foundations.
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