What numbers are › One Collection, Several Answers
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Suppose you have just spread a deck of cards on the table. How many are there? You could reply “one deck,” “four suits,” or “fifty-two cards.” Your answer depends on what you are counting. Someone who picked up a single card while you were out would still leave one deck and four suits. But “fifty-two cards” would become an error. A number claim has a condition of correctness, even when the objects admit several different ways of being counted.
In The Foundations of Arithmetic, §46, Gottlob Frege asks what goes on in statements of this sort. His examples range from counting divisions of a whole to saying that Venus has zero moons. The latter case helps isolate the problem. There is no group of moons to which you can attach a property. The statement tells you that nothing falls under the concept moon of Venus. The contribution of zero can be understood by asking what the whole sentence says about that concept.
This is the beginning of a larger problem in the 1884 book. A number statement can tell us something about a concept, but an ordinary equation like “the number of cards in the first deck equals the number of cards in the second” seems to name the same object twice. Frege wants an account that makes room for both observations, and then lets us see what sort of reasoning could establish the laws of arithmetic.
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