Mental roles and the world beyond the mind › What a Functional Explanation Adds
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Imagine that a researcher proposes to identify pain with one precise physical and chemical type of brain state. The proposal is stronger than the claim that our pains have a bodily basis. It says that organisms capable of the same kind of pain will qualify in virtue of the relevant physical and chemical state. If two cases really share the psychological state and differ in the details the theory takes to be essential, that identification fails. This is why a common bodily indicator in one species would not finish the argument.
Putnam makes the point by comparing creatures including mammals and octopuses in The Nature of Mental States, section III, pp. 76–77 in the linked reprint. The possibility of a shared physical condition is allowed. His objection is that it is demanding to require the same physical and chemical condition to occur in all creatures to which the psychological kind applies. Even if a common condition were found for pain, an identity theory proposed for mental states in general would face the same test for other states it claims to identify.
A state individuated by its role may be realized by different physical arrangements. This is the possibility that motivates the functional hypothesis. Showing that two physical arrangements differ does not yet establish that both realize a mental state. We also need grounds for classifying their states together.
What would the role amount to? Putnam uses a model of an organism as a probabilistic automaton. A description of such a system specifies states and inputs and gives the probabilities of resulting states and outputs. A given stimulus need not produce a single inevitable response. The response depends both on inputs and on the organism's other states. An account of its organization can describe how those factors fit together across cases. Putnam treats this as a hypothesis about the sort of system an organism is, with details to be made precise. The Nature of Mental States, section II, pp. 75–76
For pain, the proposal looks to a class of sensory inputs that play a characteristic role in the whole organism, including that the organism evaluates those conditions negatively. This need not make every case of pain look the same from the outside. A person might choose to endure discomfort rather than give up a goal they value more. A description that mentions both the aversive input and the competing goal can explain why behavior changes without treating the discomfort as having disappeared. Putnam expressly distinguishes assigning high disvalue to an input from always avoiding it. The Nature of Mental States, section IV, p. 78
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