Mental roles and the world beyond the mind › Why Behavior and Structure Are Different Clues
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Mental roles and the world beyond the mind › Why Behavior and Structure Are Different CluesSection view · Sections in this chapter3 / 9 ↓
Suppose one person grimaces and another keeps still after the same sort of injury. Merely observing two different reactions leaves open whether they have a similar experience. There might be a relevant difference in their sensory capacities. There might instead be a difference in what each is trying to do. On a functional proposal those other factors belong in the explanation. If the state has a characteristic role across the system, we can ask how that state together with changes in the other factors could yield divergent behavior.
This also separates the evidence for a state from the proposed explanation of that evidence. Putnam observes that we often judge whether an organism is in pain from its actions without knowing what state its brain is in. That ordinary route to a judgment does not decide what pain is. A theory of pain should be able to explain why the indications we use are informative, insofar as they are, even when the observer knows nothing about the underlying theory. This is part of Putnam's case against treating pain itself as a disposition to produce certain peripheral behavior. The Nature of Mental States, sections IV–V
The distinction is important when comparing creatures with very different bodies. A similar outward reaction suggests a question to investigate. We can ask whether similar inputs have similar consequences within two organisms and how those consequences change when goals or circumstances differ. A reflex that occurs under one condition is too little by itself to establish the similarity Putnam needs. It provides a possible starting point for trying to describe the organization of both systems. In section V he calls the identification tentative and evaluates it partly by whether it leads to fruitful predictions and questions.
There is a challenge on the other side as well. If a whole-system description can always be tailored after the fact to include whichever cases we wanted to count together, it may explain little. The hypothesis needs an informative role that holds across systems and a reason to prefer it over the available physical and chemical descriptions. Putnam acknowledges that his proposal leaves the appropriate organization underspecified. The open work is to describe it without quietly replacing the question of which organisms can feel pain by an assumption that we already know the answer.
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