Translation and its indeterminacy › How evidence starts to accumulate

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated March 18, 20254 min read
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Part 8 of 12Logic, Language, and Interpretation
Chapter 105Translation and its indeterminacy › How evidence starts to accumulate
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The earliest work starts with utterances that visibly connect to a situation. Someone says a particular thing when a rabbit crosses a path. The linguist tries the expression again, leaving room for the other person to assent, dissent, or fail to give either response. Recognizing these responses is itself an achievement. The linguist has to identify ways people accept and reject proposed utterances, including which behavior belongs to replying and which belongs to reacting to the interruption. In Quine's setup this is an empirical matter. When a reply turns up consistently in circumstances where the speaker would be expected to agree, the linguist has a working hypothesis about how assent is expressed. Word and Object, chapter II, §7.

Is one glimpse of a rabbit enough? Suppose the speaker says “Gavagai” twice, once when a rabbit is clearly present and once after something stirs in the grass. They may have seen rabbits coming out of that patch earlier. The linguist may have seen only movement and concluded too quickly that the expression applies to something else. The reverse error is also possible. The linguist might expect agreement when an animal comes into view, and the speaker may have a reason to take it for something different. Quine treats these as problems about collateral information. What someone takes from a current scene can depend on what they already know. Word and Object, chapter II, §§9–10.

Occasion sentences can receive different verdicts as the occasion changes. “It is raining” can be affirmed one day and denied the next without any change in the speaker's knowledge of the language. For observation sentences, agreement between competent speakers tends to be closely tied to the scene they are jointly situated to observe. Quine treats observationality as a matter of degree. The same speaker may be much more dependent on previous information to respond to “Bachelor!” than to respond to “Red!” Seeing a person is quite enough to bring the question of bachelorhood to mind, but the relevant information may have been acquired long before that moment. Word and Object, chapter II, §§9–11.

It matters that the linguist can distinguish an unhelpful sample from an utterance that is intrinsically less revealing in this way. Looking at rabbits from several angles and across several occasions helps the linguist find out when the remark is appropriate. Observing a person every time a team member says “Bachelor!” is much less likely on its own to reveal why the verdict is appropriate. A theory of translation has to make room for both patterns. The first makes a useful foothold precisely because the second is not always available on those terms.

Stimulus meaning

For Quine, a sentence's stimulus meaning for a given speaker at a time is an ordered pair. One part comprises the stimulations that would prompt assent when the sentence is queried. The other comprises those that would prompt dissent. Some stimulations would prompt neither. The account is about dispositions to respond and can include several senses, not just vision. Word and Object, chapter II, §8.

The sets in that definition are not a list of the things an expression names. Seeing a rabbit in light and seeing it in shadow might both prompt assent. Seeing a fox instead might prompt dissent, if the conditions are right. Many episodes can be compared once we have a sense of what portion of experience belongs in the test. Quine's definition also fixes a maximum duration for stimulations and allows a person's disposition to change over time. These specifications let him ask when an English utterance and an unfamiliar utterance serve the same purpose as occasion sentences. They do not assume we already know how the speaker classifies individual objects. Word and Object, chapter II, §§8 and 12.

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