Translation and its indeterminacy › The scope of the indeterminacy claim

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated March 18, 20253 min read
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Part 8 of 12Logic, Language, and Interpretation
Chapter 105Translation and its indeterminacy › The scope of the indeterminacy claim
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The example of the rabbit and its parts is about reference. The linguist can find evidence for roughly equivalent occasion sentences while lacking a basis for choosing what the terms within them are to count as denoting. Quine makes a further claim about rival manuals. The manuals might fit the speaker's total behavioral dispositions while producing incompatible translations of whole sentences elsewhere in the language, especially where no direct test settles what counts as the translation. Such a case would go beyond making two different assignments that coincide at the level of all translated sentences. Word and Object, chapter II, §§12, 15–16.

That last step is controversial. Early assent tests may give the same results for two incompatible accounts and then further evidence could favor one of them. Quine is claiming more than this familiar sort of limited evidence. He asks the reader to grant a fit with everything the people concerned could be disposed to say under relevant conditions. If rival manuals remain possible even then, there is a question whether a fact of correct translation still needs to be settled. He says that producing two fully worked rival manuals would take a duplicate enterprise, and argues from the character of the evidence and the procedure instead. The rabbit example opens that argument. It does not produce the pair of manuals the broader thesis calls for. Word and Object, chapter II, §§15–16, especially pp. 70–74.

Someone could grant the point about evidence and say the speaker nevertheless means something determinate. They could propose that the speaker's representation of a rabbit has a causal or psychological identity not revealed by observed agreement. Quine's challenge is to specify what the proposed difference would establish. In §16 he considers the thought that a bilingual's correlation may be realized by a neural condition. Suppose another bilingual has an incompatible correlation yet the two use each language in the same ways when considered separately. Locating a correlation in these people's brains would tell us something about how they translate and still leave open which correlation captures a further language-wide fact. That case preserves a role for psychology while pressing the demand for an account of what fixes the translation. Word and Object, chapter II, §16, pp. 72–75.

Indeterminacy also differs from the availability of several graceful phrasings in English. Translators frequently choose among expressions they regard as interchangeable for current purposes. Quine asks about manuals that support incompatible readings when their outcomes for a particular sentence are set beside one another in isolation. One answer may be appropriate only within the other commitments of its own manual. That is why he compares whole systems in §§15–16 and makes the compatibility of each with observable dispositions part of his thesis. Word and Object, chapter II, §16, pp. 72–78.

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