Translation and its indeterminacy › The sentence and the term

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated March 18, 20253 min read
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Part 8 of 12Logic, Language, and Interpretation
Chapter 105Translation and its indeterminacy › The sentence and the term
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Suppose “Rabbit!” and “Gavagai!” have closely matching stimulus meanings. In circumstances where a rabbit is visible, a part of a rabbit that is still attached is visible too. So is a temporal stage of the rabbit's life. A decision to correlate the whole utterances does not settle which of these objects a term can be true of if it occurs inside a longer sentence. It also leaves open where the word or construction that plays the role of a term begins and ends. That is why the experiment starts from the whole utterance rather than treating the first sound the linguist records as a word with an assigned object. Word and Object, chapter II, §12.

We can test the difference by pointing twice. A rabbit darts behind a tree and reappears. A linguist who had already established the words for “same” and “one” might ask whether that was one and the same rabbit. To establish those expressions in the first place, they would have to know which responses count as confirming an identity or a count. The problem is especially visible if the rabbit turns around and presents a different side. One scheme can record the same animal under a new view, while another can treat the stages or parts as different units joined by an appropriate relation. What the speaker answers about sameness may fit either scheme once the expressions for individuation have been interpreted accordingly. Word and Object, chapter II, §12 and §§15–16.

Try replacing the English word “rabbit” with “rabbit part” in a translation while leaving everything else word for word. The result would get plenty of cases wrong. For example, a remark that translated as “There are two rabbits” would be false as a claim about the total number of rabbit parts. Quine's argument requires a coordinated change that accommodates identity, number, and other expressions. The important suggestion is that translation can still get right the observable conditions in which people endorse that whole remark while differing in how it assigns values to the parts. The possibility of compensation gives the example its force. A bare substitution makes no such point. Word and Object, chapter II, §§12 and 15.

There is room to evaluate the translations using ordinary constraints. A translator can learn more expressions, test agreements in fresh situations, and aim for a coherent grammar. A manually shuffled translation that recovers only the first mention of a rabbit will generally fare badly over the rest of the language. Quine's conjecture is about schemes that meet much more demanding conditions. The reference question becomes pressing when changing the scheme as a whole leaves the judgments the experiment can test in place. An extra photograph of the rabbit cannot on its own decide the scheme in which an identity question should be read.

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