Mind and category mistakes › How Far Does the Diagnosis Reach?
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Mind and category mistakes › How Far Does the Diagnosis Reach?Section view · Sections in this chapter6 / 8 ↓
There is a tempting jump from Ryle's examples to a theory on which people have no experiences that are difficult for others to observe. Think of two patients in a waiting room who both sit still. One could be in pain and keeping quiet; the other could be comfortable. The visible posture does not tell us which is which. We might ask what else we can learn about their situations and why a person's own report can matter. The opening diagnosis supplies no reason to discount such a report. The mistake Ryle is trying to expose is a philosophical inference from our accounts of thinking, feeling, and acting to a parallel life of events that the accounts are supposed always to describe. Chapter I, §2
A related objection comes from the inside. If I concentrate in order to remember an address, it seems possible that I do some mental work before I say anything. A Rylean can grant the recollection. The question is what follows about an account of memory. The fact that I silently go over part of the address and then say the rest makes for a different episode than immediately blurting it out. But establishing how the episode unfolded does not yet tell us that competence in remembering addresses must always consist in going through that episode. Separating those points leaves space for both psychological inquiry and the conceptual distinction about skill.
An objector might also reject the strong premise of the regress while defending a role for internal representations. An explanation could say that unconscious states help produce an action without requiring that each internal state be preceded by a further act of intelligent deliberation. Ryle's regress would not by itself refute that proposal. Its premise targets an account on which an earlier intelligent act of rule consideration is always needed. A defender of internal mechanisms has a different task: specify what the mechanisms contribute and why their operation helps explain the pattern of competent conduct.
That leaves a fruitful distinction between asking how to recognize an intelligent action and asking what makes it physically possible. Try describing a chess player's move in terms of a threatened piece and then in terms of the movement of a hand. These descriptions answer different questions. If we want to know why the move avoided a loss, the first is relevant. If we want to know why the player had difficulty lifting the piece, the second might help. The mere fact that a description omits the information supplied by another description does not show that the two descriptions concern two parallel actions. Chapter I, §§2–3
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