Mind and category mistakes › Knowing How and Knowing That

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated June 24, 20253 min read
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Part 7 of 12Mind, Self, and Experience
Chapter 81Mind and category mistakes › Knowing How and Knowing That
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Imagine a chess learner who can accurately repeat the rules and has memorized some useful maxims. Even so, she blunders a piece when the position takes a form she has not seen before. Her opponent notices a threat and adapts to it. Both may be able to state the rule that governs a move, but the same ability to reproduce it tells us little about the difference in their play. The learner still needs to recognize when a maxim applies, which considerations to weigh, and when an exception matters.

Knowing that describes grasp of a fact or proposition. Knowing how describes a competence. The difference is plain when a teacher asks a pupil to recite a rule and then asks the pupil to use it to solve an unfamiliar problem. It would be equally misleading to assume that the competent pupil never consults a rule or thinks through a problem in words. A lesson can improve a student's practice by giving them a rule to use. The question is whether the intelligent application of a rule can always be explained by a prior intelligent operation of consulting one. Chapter II, §§2–3, “Intelligence and Intellect” and “Knowing How and Knowing That”

Ryle's regress tests precisely that proposal. Suppose a chess move is intelligent only because the player first intelligently considers what a rule says to do. The first consideration is itself something the player must do intelligently. On the proposed account she therefore first has to consider a rule for considering the rule. That prior consideration is subject to the same demand. The explanation postpones what makes any application intelligent at every step. Ryle's conclusion concerns the requirement that an intelligent operation must always inherit its intelligence from a separate prior theoretical operation. He can grant that deliberation sometimes contributes to a good move and that deliberation itself can be clever or clumsy. Chapter II, §3

There is a simple way to see why merely inserting a thought does so little work. Picture a student who correctly thinks, “Look for a threat,” then checks only the moves that suit the attack she already wants to make. Her maxim is sensible. The way she used it was poor. Something similar can happen in the other direction: a player who has practiced a pattern spots the overlooked defender immediately and explains the move only after being asked. We can distinguish the quality of the play from the timing of an explicit explanation. The distinction leaves room for the thought itself to be assessed, both as planning and as a subsequent explanation. An explanation after the move can also show the teacher whether the student noticed the defender or arrived at the best move by chance.

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