Mind and category mistakes › The Two Careers of the Official Doctrine
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Mind and category mistakes › The Two Careers of the Official DoctrineSection view · Sections in this chapter2 / 8 ↓
Ryle calls his target the official doctrine and associates it chiefly with Descartes. The distinction matters. The opening chapter sets out a philosophical picture and tests its consequences. You can follow the test without assuming that every detail of Ryle's reconstruction is a fair account of Descartes.
On this picture a person has a public bodily history. Bodies occupy space, move, and are available to observation. The person also has a mental history, the episodes of which are available directly to that person alone. Other people can at best infer a mental history from the movements and utterances they observe. Describing a neighbour as anxious then seems to require a conjecture about a hidden episode. The neighbour's access to that episode is supposed to be of a different order from ours. Ryle calls the picture the ghost in the machine. Chapter I, §§1–2
A question about other minds follows. Suppose I infer that my neighbour is concerned because she keeps returning to a problem and asks questions about its consequences. Under the doctrine Ryle describes, her actions are evidence for an episode that I can never consult directly. Analogies with my own experience may make my conjecture plausible, but I cannot inspect her inner stream to see whether the conjecture succeeded. The philosophical picture makes that restriction part of the meaning of psychological description, even for the teachers, friends, and critics who already use those descriptions and sometimes correct them. Ryle takes the gap between the picture and these ordinary practices seriously. It is a reason to investigate how the descriptions actually work. Chapter I, §1, “The Official Doctrine”
The doctrine faces a different problem when an intention appears to issue in a bodily action. The two careers have been described in terms of different kinds of processes. An account of how one process brings about another must explain why the connection is intelligible. In Ryle's reconstruction, theorists have treated the mental and the bodily as competing kinds of cause from the beginning. The later interaction puzzle thus also provides a reason to ask what licensed the initial classification. Chapter I, §3, “The Origin of the Category-Mistake”
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