Comparing actual injustices › Capabilities and Functionings

Michael BrenndoerferNovember 1, 20262 min read
PhilosophyAll chapters
Reading tools Notes & comments
Notes & comments
Part 10 of 12Justice and Political Authority
Chapter 125Comparing actual injustices › Capabilities and Functionings
Reading section 5 of 8 · Capabilities and Functionings · 2 minSection 5 of 8 · 2 min

Section 5 of 8 · 2 min read

Comparing actual injustices › Capabilities and FunctioningsSection view · Sections in this chapter5 / 8 ↓

Consider two people who have not eaten. One could eat a meal and has chosen to fast. The other cannot get any food. They share an observed state, but only the first has the alternative available. Assessing their actual freedom calls for information beyond the achievement recorded at a particular time. The difference also matters for agency, since the first person's condition results from a choice they can exercise.

Sen distinguishes a functioning, a doing or being that a person achieves, from a capability, the real freedom to achieve functionings. The relevant freedom concerns which combinations of achievements a person actually has available. What they do may be one of several attainable lives or the only one open to them. The Introduction, “Realizations, Lives and Capabilities,” pp. 18–20, connects this freedom with the assessment of a person's life. Chapters 11–13 develop the approach in relation to lives, resources, and well-being.

Resources can be essential to that freedom. They do not always give two people the same scope for action. Imagine two passengers receive the same transit credit. One can use it to reach work on an accessible route. If the other cannot board the buses that run at the necessary time, the credit is a different practical opportunity even though its amount is identical. An assessment of capability would ask about travel conditions as well as the formal entitlement to a ride. Changing the timetable or adapting the vehicles could change the real opportunity without increasing the nominal credit.

This comparison can also show why judging people by their eventual choices alone gives an incomplete picture. Someone may decide to stay close to home because no accessible transport is available. If transport becomes available and the person still stays home, little may change in a record of trips. They can now respond to a new job offer or visit a friend if they wish. The new option matters even before it is acted on. At the same time, the capability approach leaves work to do when different valuable opportunities conflict. It tells us to consider substantive freedom, and it leaves the value of particular freedoms open to reasoning in the case at hand.

Comments

Add to the conversation

A question, a correction, or an example from your own work.

No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts!

Newsletter

Stay up to date

Get new articles, book updates, and notes on AI and technology.

Unsubscribe at any time. Privacy policy