Comparing actual injustices › Reasons Can Agree Without Becoming Identical

Michael BrenndoerferNovember 1, 20262 min read
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Part 10 of 12Justice and Political Authority
Chapter 125Comparing actual injustices › Reasons Can Agree Without Becoming Identical
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Three considerations might all favor remedying a case of exclusion. One person takes the exclusion to be a breach of equal standing. Another emphasizes the practical harm it causes. A third focuses on what is owed under an existing public commitment. If all three agree that the proposed change is better than leaving the exclusion in place, they need not settle the relative weight of the considerations in every other case before supporting it.

In his October 2009 talk on the book, Sen connects this possibility to social choice reasoning. Reasons can survive critical examination without collapsing into a single principle. The common part of the rankings they support can guide some comparisons. In others, the surviving criteria will point in different directions and we may have to leave the judgment unsettled or give further reasons. An ordering that leaves some options incomparable can still give a determinate judgment about other pairs.

Imagine three proposals to change a housing application. The first has high fees, an inaccessible form, and a short deadline. The second makes the form accessible and lowers the fee without creating a new obstacle. People have several reasons to prefer it to the first even if they differ in the importance they assign to each improvement. A third proposal might be easier to use in one respect and less reliable in another. Ranking the second proposal against the first does not require a final answer about the third. A theory of justice has work to do in both comparisons, but success in one need not await success in the other.

This is also where the role of closer examination matters. Someone's immediate impression of a practice can give inquiry a starting point, as Sen says in the Preface. A closer look can disclose unreliable assumptions or the perspectives of people initially left out. Rejecting the idea that there is always a unique complete answer gives us no reason to accept every reason offered. The arguments still have to survive scrutiny.

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