Truth and understanding a speaker › Building a theory from a finite stock
PhilosophyAll chapters Reading tools Notes & comments
Truth and understanding a speaker › Building a theory from a finite stockSection view · Sections in this chapter2 / 8 ↓
You understand “The copper kettle on the third shelf is slightly dented” although you may never have heard the sentence before. You know words that occur in it, can pick out the phrase describing a particular kettle, and can see what the rest of the sentence says about it. You could extend the sentence or understand further sentences about other objects. A theory that lists a separate interpretation for every possible sentence would offer little explanation of how a person can do that. Davidson asks for a theory with finitely many resources that can yield results for indefinitely many sentences. Davidson, “Truth and Meaning,” pp. 304–308.
A common response is to assign meanings to the individual words and ask how their meanings combine. That names the task but leaves a question about the work done by the assignment. Suppose you say the name “Mara” contributes Mara and the words “has left” contribute some entity called the meaning of “has left.” How does that pair of contributions determine what would be true when the sentence is true? Davidson examines why adding putative entities can leave the job just as hard as it was. He proposes treating the semantic work as a matter of deriving the truth condition of the sentence through systematic rules sensitive to its parts. “Truth and Meaning,” pp. 304–309.
A tiny language can make this easier to see. Suppose it has names, some words for properties, and a construction that makes the equivalent of “and.” Give the theory a rule explaining when a named object satisfies a predicate and another explaining when a conjunction holds. It can now derive that “Mara has left and the door is open” is true exactly when Mara has left and the door is open. The rules for a simple language may sound trivial. They can nonetheless apply repeatedly to longer sentences, so there is no need to enter those sentences separately in a phrasebook. A theory for a real language has more constructions to account for and would have to preserve this systematic feature.
Comments
Add to the conversation
A question, a correction, or an example from your own work.
No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts!