Truth and understanding a speaker › Where the program meets its limits
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A truth theory for assertions can leave important features of speech unexamined. Suppose you repeat “It is raining” as a warning, as a line of dialogue, or while testing a microphone. The sentence can have an intelligible truth condition in each use. To understand what you were doing, an interpreter would also have to know the role it played on the occasion. Indexicals create a different issue, one Davidson addresses in “Truth and Meaning.” Who and when can enter into the truth condition itself. Determining which aspect of an utterance creates a difficulty helps specify what a proposed account has to explain. The collection develops applications to quotation, reports of what people said, and grammatical mood, each with problems of its own. “Truth and Meaning,” pp. 317–320. Inquiries, “Applications”.
There is also a question about how much the formal theory explains. A theorist might correctly derive that Kurt's utterance is true when it is raining near him without explaining which evidence first made the interpretation compelling. Another theorist might offer an insightful description of the evidence without showing how those guesses generalize to sentences Kurt has never said. Davidson's essays put those difficulties together. The truth theory has to explain how the parts and composition make sentences interpretable, and the evidence has to explain why these are the assignments that make sense of this speaker. What seems obvious once we know German can then become an instructive case of how understanding is possible.
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