Truth and understanding a speaker › What the radical interpreter has to go on
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“Radical” signals what the interpreter is allowed to assume. The interpreter starts without a translation, a dictionary, or detailed prior knowledge of what the speaker believes. A useful starting point is that a person takes some sentences to be true on some occasions. Recognizing that someone endorses a sentence can be easier than determining what they believe in endorsing it. Davidson treats this attitude as evidence, together with the circumstances of the utterance. A cry of surprise or an overheard line from a play would call for a different diagnosis. Describing the evidence as what Kurt holds true marks a difference between these cases. “Radical Interpretation,” pp. 321–323.
Return to Kurt and the weather. The interpreter notices that Kurt accepts the sentence when it is raining near him, then watches what happens when there is lightning but no rain, when it rains elsewhere, and when the rain has stopped. The theory may come to assign a truth condition involving rain near the speaker at the time of utterance. That assignment is distinct from the report about Kurt at noon and from a generalization about when he in fact assents. The difference leaves space for Kurt to be mistaken. He might answer yes when he hears a sprinkler or fail to notice the rain starting. Repeated observations and the role of the sentence in other combinations can support a reading in spite of individual discrepancies. “Radical Interpretation,” pp. 322–324.
The interpreter also has to consider structure. Suppose they observe a speaker who uses a recognizable construction to reject a report about wind, the same construction to reject a report about rain, and the construction again to reject a claim about the time. Interpreting the construction as negation could unify those patterns. It also constrains further assignments. If the theory interprets each episode separately, assigning a weather term one day and an unrelated clock term the next, there is less reason to expect it to explain what the speaker does with a new sentence. Davidson thinks an interpretation is answerable both to formal constraints and to evidence about how the speaker takes sentences to apply. “Radical Interpretation,” pp. 320–324.
Radical interpretation is an explanatory test. It asks what an interpreter would need to know and how that knowledge could be supported. Readers need not imagine a child formulating axioms or ordinary speakers consciously solving an inference problem. A finite theory can describe relations someone has mastered implicitly. Davidson's project is to explain what can be known about a speaker from the public evidence and why that knowledge would suffice for interpretation. “Truth and Meaning,” pp. 310–312. “Radical Interpretation,” pp. 313–315.
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