Truth and understanding a speaker › Listening to someone who says it is raining
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Davidson asks us to imagine interpreting a person called Kurt. Near Kurt it is raining. It is Saturday at noon, and Kurt holds the sentence “Es regnet” true. If we already know German, the interpretation is easy. He takes it to be raining. Now suppose the interpreter knows neither German nor which belief Kurt is expressing. The connection between the weather and the sentence is still available as evidence. But Kurt could hold the sentence true because he means something other than what the interpreter guesses, or because he has a belief that turns out to be wrong. One observation does not settle which. Davidson, “Radical Interpretation,” pp. 322–324.
The two problems go together. Interpreting an utterance requires some idea of what the speaker takes to be the case. Ascribing a belief on the basis of the utterance requires some idea of what the sentence means. Donald Davidson's Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, first collected in 1984, asks how an interpreter can get to grips with both. “Truth and Meaning” proposes a role for a formal theory that states truth conditions. “Radical Interpretation” asks how someone could have evidence for such a theory without already knowing the interpretation it is meant to supply. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, contents and edition information.
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