Truth and understanding a speaker › What the truth theory supplies
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Alfred Tarski's work shows how to use one language to formulate a definition of truth for another. The language being examined is the object language. The language in which the theorist formulates rules and proves consequences is the metalanguage. They may overlap, as when we use English to discuss a sentence in English. If we use English to investigate German, the difference is more visible. The German inscription is mentioned and the English sentence is used to state the condition under which what it expresses is true. “Truth and Meaning,” pp. 308–311.
A typical result says that the sentence “Snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white. The quotation marks on the left name the sentence. The words on the right specify a condition without quotation marks. A Tarski-style theory derives such results, called T-sentences, using the structure of the expressions involved. Tarski's Convention T is a condition of adequacy for a truth definition. It requires that the definition yield the appropriate biconditionals. In setting up a truth definition, one can already understand the object language or know the translations one needs. Davidson asks how a theory of that form could guide interpretation when an adequate translation is what we are trying to discover. “Truth and Meaning,” pp. 308–311. “Radical Interpretation,” pp. 317–321.
Knowing that two claims have the same truth value on one occasion does little to show what either means. The informative work comes from a truth theory whose rules derive the truth conditions for the whole language and which survives testing against the use of that language.
Davidson's own example brings out the gap. If snow is white and grass is green, a biconditional can pair “Snow is white” with the condition that grass is green and come out true. That does not make the pair an adequate stand-alone interpretation. Davidson asks whether it would be possible for a strange pairing to follow from a systematic theory that gets all the results right. Its acceptability would depend on what the theory does across the language and how it derives them. A reader can thus reject coincidence as a test of meaning without replacing the theory with a separate list of synonymies. “Truth and Meaning,” pp. 310–312.
The job is more visible when the truth condition varies with context. “I am tired” can be true when one person says it and false when someone else does, or false for its first speaker in the morning. A rule can state that such an utterance is true for the relevant speaker at the relevant time exactly when that person is tired then. The theory has to account for expressions such as “I” and “that book” through the way reference varies with use. Davidson takes this to give a useful test for an interpretation because the relevant person, time, and object can keep changing. “Truth and Meaning,” pp. 317–319.
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