Truth and understanding a speaker › Charity and the difference between error and different speech

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated October 6, 20252 min read
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Part 8 of 12Logic, Language, and Interpretation
Chapter 104Truth and understanding a speaker › Charity and the difference between error and different speech
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Suppose you think someone has said that it is raining and you can see a cloudless sky. The person might have the weather wrong. They might be describing a place you cannot see, repeating a forecast, or using an expression you have misunderstood. There is no general instruction to prefer one explanation in every case. To treat the words as describing rain in the first place, you need reasons drawn from how they are used and from how the speaker responds to circumstances both of you can observe. With those reasons in hand, the theory can give a substantive account of why this particular judgment is an error.

Davidson calls attention to the role of charity in getting this process started. The interpreter tries to make the speaker's total pattern of assent broadly intelligible and to find considerable agreement about ordinary circumstances. Some amount of agreement helps the interpreter identify the subject of disagreements. It would be hard to make sense of a person as mistakenly denying every ordinary fact about the weather if the case supplies no independent reason to think weather is what their words are about. Davidson cautions against taking maximization literally as a count of individual agreement cases. Which agreements matter and under what conditions is part of making the best overall fit. “Radical Interpretation,” pp. 323–325.

There is room to worry that a commitment to agreement creates a bias toward how the interpreter already sees things. For example, an interpreter who assumes every color word has the same boundaries as a word in their own language might take several sound applications as mistakes. Better interpretations can make distinctions the interpreter did not expect. Davidson's framework gives an account of how this correction could happen. The evidence includes which judgments the speaker repeats in other circumstances, what counts for them as a reason for changing their mind, and the place of the disputed sentence alongside beliefs the interpreter can already recognize. Charity works at that larger scale. There is room for considerable difference in the assignments that make the exchange intelligible.

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