Thinking through categories › Being, Nothing, and Becoming
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Thinking through categories › Being, Nothing, and BecomingSection view · Sections in this chapter3 / 8 ↓
In “With What Must Science Begin?”, §§88–110, Hegel distinguishes the standpoint of pure knowing, which he relates to the conclusion of the Phenomenology, from the character of the beginning inside the Logic. Within the exposition he begins with something immediate. A beginning that already contained a developed distinction would depend on the work that made that distinction available. Pure being is the attempt to make a beginning without taking a determination of this kind for granted. The absence of a developed premise in that specific opening is compatible with there being a route to the standpoint from which one can make it.
Here is one way to follow the first transition. Think of pure nothing as well as pure being. Leave out any absent object: no missing key, empty field, or unrealized plan. Every one of those examples tells you what is absent by reference to a content. Once they are set aside, Hegel asks what determination distinguishes the remaining thought from the one you called pure being. Each has an intended role, but each is empty when treated on its own terms. Hegel says they prove inseparable in the movement in which one has already vanished into the other. The argument turns on the attempted presentation of the two pure categories. Its terms do not describe a material thing emerging from empty space.
Becoming gives the distinction a way to matter. In one direction, nothing passes into being, the aspect of coming to be. In the other, being passes into nothing, the aspect of ceasing to be. They are distinguishable directions of the movement. The exposition then asks whether becoming can itself persist with its moments always vanishing into one another. The result is the more stable unity that Hegel calls determinate being. This is where being has a qualitative character, rather than the emptiness with which the chapter opened. See Becoming, §§135–183. The broader sequence and direct links are in the analytic contents.
When the first transition seems too fast, write down any contrast you have already supplied between pure being and pure nothing. Ask whether it depends on an object, a time, an act of thinking, or a prior relation. That makes it easier to tell whether you are challenging Hegel's account of a pure beginning or simply thinking of another kind of being.
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