Thinking through categories › How Can Logic Begin?
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Thinking through categories › How Can Logic Begin?Section view · Sections in this chapter1 / 8 ↓
Hegel opens the Science of Logic by asking you to think being while leaving out everything that would tell you what is. You cannot think a tree, a number, or a place, since each would give the thought a character that distinguishes it from other thoughts. You cannot even treat being as one side of an opposition. That would already say how it relates to something else. The exercise sounds easy until you try to say what content is left.
The opening chapter, §§132–134, draws its first result from that difficulty. Pure being has no determination by which you could distinguish it from pure nothing. And yet the two are introduced as distinct. Hegel takes the movement between them to be a better account of what the opening has brought into view than either category in isolation. How can a distinction be present and fail to stand on its own? The rest of the book repeatedly asks questions of that kind at levels where more has been determined.
The work appeared in installments from 1812 to 1816. Its first two books examine being and essence, and its third examines the Concept, also called the Notion in A. V. Miller's English translation. These are changes in what is being examined as well as divisions on a contents page. To see why Hegel expects one to lead to another, it helps to set aside the expectation that logic here will mean only assessing whether a conclusion follows from stated premises. He examines the categories those premises and conclusions can employ in the first place.
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