Thinking through categories › Essence and Its Relations

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated July 27, 20262 min read
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Part 6 of 12Being, Change, and Possibility
Chapter 76Thinking through categories › Essence and Its Relations
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A question about essence can begin with an ordinary sense that an immediate appearance does not explain itself. In the opening of the Doctrine of Essence, Hegel gives this change of standpoint its own problem. Once we treat what appears as mediated, what is the relation between it and what is supposed to explain it? If the two are simply separated into a surface and a hidden thing, the relation between them has still to be established. Hegel examines the ways what first looked like an independent determination turns out to depend on a relation it could not simply leave behind.

Identity and difference provide an example. When you say a thing is identical with itself, the statement can look independent of anything else. Yet as soon as the saying has a job, as it does when you are trying to identify a particular object, being able to distinguish it becomes relevant. This everyday example gives a reason to ask why identity and difference should be treated as wholly unrelated. Hegel's own argument goes further. In “Contradiction,” §§931–963, he examines how the poles of an opposition are determined through a reference to one another while each also presents itself as independent. The conflict concerns the claim of independence. It is a poor shortcut to conclude that Hegel licenses every pair of contradictory assertions. The useful question is which two commitments of the position cannot be maintained together, and what their tension reveals.

Essence also reaches Actuality, where Hegel sets out connected forms of actuality, possibility and necessity. Consider a claim that a project could happen. Saying that the description involves no explicit contradiction is different from saying that the conditions under which it could be made real are already available. That difference is a way into Hegel's distinction between ways of taking possibility. It also shows why his logic is demanding even where its terms sound ordinary. To understand one term, you must ask what the relation to the other terms is doing in the claim.

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