Thinking through categories › The Concept and the Idea

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated July 27, 20262 min read
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Part 6 of 12Being, Change, and Possibility
Chapter 76Thinking through categories › The Concept and the Idea
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In the introduction to the Doctrine of the Notion, §§1279–1305, Hegel treats being and essence as moments in the development of the Concept. Consider how little is said by calling a concept a label that fits several things. That description leaves the distinct instances outside the label. It does not tell you whether the concept itself supplies a principle of distinguishing its forms. For Hegel the latter is central. Universality, particularity and individuality belong together in an articulated concept. A universal that could only remain general by excluding all particularization would lack that articulation.

Hegel treats judgment and syllogism within this development. In judgment the moments of the Concept are divided and related, for example as subject and predicate. The syllogism considers the role of a mediating term. Hegel also goes beyond these forms into objectivity and then the Idea. The analytic contents for Subjective Logic distinguish Mechanism, Chemism, and Teleology within Objectivity, and Life, Cognition, and the Absolute Idea within the Idea. Those headings mark changes of problem. A reader who treats the Doctrine of the Concept solely as a study of predication will have trouble explaining why its middle section addresses kinds of objective connection and purposive activity at all.

The concluding chapter, “The Absolute Idea,” §§1781–1817, brings theoretical and practical Idea together. In knowing, the thought has to answer to the object. In purposive activity, the object is also something a concept can be involved in bringing about. The conclusion has to account for both sides. Hegel then returns to the method of the whole exposition, including the beginning that appeared so empty. The beginning was immediate within the exposition. From the end, readers can also examine why the beginning had to be so through following what the successive determinations made available.

Near the end Hegel describes the Idea's relation to nature as a free release. That is a distinctive claim about the status of the transition. It is more informative to keep the wording and its problem in view than to say that the categories chronologically made the world. Nothing in the opening exercise tells a reader the temperature at which a particular sample boils. Whether the argument establishes that nature belongs within the scope of the Idea is a different question, and the final section gives you a place to ask it.

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