Thinking through categories › What Hegel Means by Logic

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated July 27, 20262 min read
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Part 6 of 12Being, Change, and Possibility
Chapter 76Thinking through categories › What Hegel Means by Logic
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In the Introduction, §§33–87, Hegel considers a familiar division of labor. Logic supplies formal rules, and another enterprise supplies the material to which the rules apply. Given a claim about the cause of an event, you can ask whether an inference made from it is valid regardless of which event it concerns. But there is a different question about what a cause is, which an assessment of the inference as valid does not settle. Neither does listing a set of examples settle it. Hegel wants to see how a category such as cause can be understood by examining its relation to effect and the further categories that relation brings into play.

One reason for the unusual scope is Hegel's criticism of the view that forms of thought belong to a subject while the content has its own ready-made character elsewhere. If the relation between form and content is assumed at the outset, the account already relies on determinations it has not examined. Hegel treats both formal thinking and its putatively separate material as requiring an account. In the Introduction he accordingly gives objective logic work that earlier philosophy assigned to metaphysics. His argument is more demanding than the observation that we use concepts when discussing the world. He takes the articulated content of these forms of thought to be a subject in its own right and refuses to settle its relation to objectivity by stipulation.

The point becomes clearer if you compare two questions about an explanation. One asks whether you reached your conclusion by a permissible rule. The other asks whether assigning a ground for something has just described it again in different words. The first grants you the terms in which the reasoning was set out. The second makes the explanatory relation itself a problem. A person could have no difficulty with the first and remain dissatisfied with the second. Hegel's project takes this dissatisfaction seriously and asks what an informative ground would have to do.

A distinction in terms

Miller's translation calls the first two books Objective Logic and the third Subjective Logic or the Doctrine of the Notion. The third book also includes a section called Objectivity. The name Subjective Logic does not restrict it to how a particular person happens to think.

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